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Vision: Non-illusory Evidence for Distinct Visual Pathways for Perception and Action 
 
Robert W. Kentridge 
 
When visual information about an object’s distance is obscured, but its retinal size visible, the object’s 
physical size is ambiguous to vision, however, additional proprioceptive distance information permits 
physical size to be estimated when grasping the object, but perceptual size estimates remain 
inaccurate, adding to that evidence for distinct visual pathways for perception and action. 
 
Is visual information that is used to guide action towards an object processed in a different way from 
visual information that gives rise to conscious experience of the identity of objects in the world? The 
influential two-visual-systems hypothesis of Milner and Goodale [1] suggests that this is the case. 
This hypothesis is based to a great extent on evidence from experiments with animals and work with 
neuropsychological patients having damage in one of two distinct pathways that project forward from 
the primary visual cortex into the parietal or temporal lobes. A number of studies have tested for 
functional dissociations consistent with the two-visual-systems hypothesis in neurotypical observers 
using a variety of tasks based on visual illusions. In these studies, stimuli that were subject to 
perceptual size illusions were, nevertheless, grasped nearly veridically. These studies have, however, 
been the subject of ongoing controversy about the relative demands of the grasping and perceptual 
estimation, tasks. A new study by Chen et al. [2], reported in this issue of Current Biology, 
demonstrates dissociation between grasping and perceptual size estimation using a quite different 
approach that is not subject to these issues, based on the effect of proprioceptive distance information 
on size constancy when visual information about the distance to an object is restricted. 
Milner and Goodale’s [1] two-visual-systems hypothesis has had a central place in our 
understanding of the functional and anatomical organisation of the human visual system for over 
twenty years. The notion that distinct functional roles of visual information are reflected in 
anatomically distinct pathways arose from animal studies in the 1960s and 70s by Schneider [3] and 
Ingle [4], and culminated in the suggestion by Ungerleider and Mishkin [5] that the primate visual 
system could be divided into a dorsal stream passing from primary visual cortex to parietal cortex in 
which information about objects’ locations is coded, and a ventral stream passing from primary visual 
cortex to temporal cortex in which information about objects’ identity is coded.  
Milner and Goodale [1] refined these ideas into a hypothesis stating that the dorsal stream is 
not simply responsible for coding location, but rather more generally for extracting information useful 
in the visual guidance of goal-directed action. Furthermore, only ventral stream processes gave rise to 
conscious experience. Much of the impetus for this position came from studies of patients with visual 
form agnosia and optic ataxia. The visual form agnosic patient DF, with ventral stream lesions, could 
not identify objects, or even discriminate their shapes, but her goal-directed actions — such as 
grasping an object with appropriate grip or posting a letter through an oriented slot — were 
unimpaired, despite her inability consciously to report the size, orientation and shape of objects. In 
contrast, patients with optic ataxia, with dorsal stream lesions, could identify objects but were very 
poor at making appropriate goal-directed actions. 
A number of studies [6–8] have shown that procedures that cause the position of targets to be 
misperceived do not affect the accuracy with which normal observers localise targets through pointing 
or eye-movements. In 1995, Aglioti et al. [9] published a study using the ‘Titchener circles’ illusion 
which showed a similar dissociation between inaccuracy in perceptual estimates of targets’ sizes and 
more accurate scaling of grip when the same targets were grasped (Figure 1). At first sight, these 
results appeared to provide clear evidence for functionally distinct systems for perception and goal-
directed action in normal observers, consistent with the two-visual-systems hypothesis. This study and 
its successors have, however, proved controversial, with new experiments, aimed towards either 
supporting or refuting the distinction between performance in grasping and perceptual estimation, 
continuing to be published and debated to this day [10,11]. With criticisms also being raised about 
aspects of the neuropsychological evidence for the two-visual-systems hypothesis [12], new lines of 
evidence which might contribute to the debate should be welcomed. 
In their 1995 paper, Aglioti et al. [9] discussed why perceptual size estimation might be 
subject to illusions that grasping was not. One possibility suggested was that illusions involve 
exploiting visual cues to distance from relations between objects in a scene that may, in some 
circumstances, be invalid — for example, retinal size comparisons in which implicit assumptions are 
made about size-distance relations — whereas grasping, being focused on a single target, is less 
susceptible those relational cues. The new paper of Chen et al. [2] returns to this theme and is 
explicitly directed at assessing size constancy in perception and grasping — that is, the estimation of 
an object’s physical size regardless of the angular size it subtends on the retina — without the 
complexities of design and interpretation associated with illusions. 
Chen et al. [2] presented their (neurotypical) observers with views of a real sphere which they 
either had to grasp, or to provide a perceptual estimate of its physical size by matching the distance 
between their thumb and forefinger to that size. Responses to three different sizes of spheres were 
analysed. The distance between the sphere and the observer varied so accurate size estimation 
required information about the retinal size of the image of the sphere and an estimate of its distance to 
be combined. In one condition, the sphere was viewed in normal illumination and a variety of visual 
cues to its distance were available. In the second condition, the sphere, which was coated in 
luminescent paint, was viewed in darkness, monocularly, through a pinhole. The sphere was visible 
by virtue of its luminescence, but the view of its surroundings, including all cues to its distance, was 
greatly restricted. In a final manipulation subjects either kept their non-grasping hand in their laps, or 
it was placed directly below the sphere on its supporting pedestal, thereby providing a proprioceptive 
cue to the sphere’s distance.  
The results show that both perceptual estimation and grasp size demonstrate size constancy 
when the lights were on (grasp and perceptual estimate size were unaffected by the distance at which 
spheres were presented). In the restricted viewing condition, perceptual estimates of size were 
erroneously significantly reduced at greater distances. Grasping was also affected when 
proprioceptive cues were unavailable, but with proprioceptive cues the distance to the sphere did not 
affect grasp size – in other words size constancy was preserved. There appears to be a functional 
difference between vision for action and perceptual size estimation. 
A range of criticisms have been aimed at illusion-based studies purporting to demonstrate 
such function dissociations. Some of these have been resolved by further experiment, but some 
remain controversial [13]. Among these criticisms are the following. First, that equating comparative 
perceptual judgements of the sizes of the central discs in the Titchener circles illusion with grasps 
directed towards just one of the discs (but see [10,14]) is problematic. Second, that the obstacle 
avoidance demands of grasping the disc in the centre of the large circles are lower than those of 
grasping the disc surrounded by small circles which counteracts the perceptual illusion for grasp. 
Third, that the surrounding circles, which are two dimensional in contrast to the three dimensional 
central discs, are irrelevant in grasp formation. Fourth, that illusory displays do, in fact, affect 
grasping. Fifth, that the relationship between disc sizes and perceptual size estimates have a non-
unitary slope — for any increase in the size of the disc the perceptual size estimates increase is larger 
— and this must be taken into account when making comparisons with grasp size. And sixth, that the 
illusion still affects action components other than that measured (maximum grip aperture).  
The Chen et al. [2] study aimed to eliminate these concerns: no comparative judgments need 
be made; there are no obstacle avoidance demands; there are no illusion inducers, flat or otherwise; 
size constancy is perfect for restricted vision with proprioceptive cues; and a correction is applied to 
account for differences in the slopes of changes in object size of perceptual estimates and grasp 
apertures. It remains to be seen whether action parameters other than maximum grip aperture are 
affected regardless of proprioception, although it would not be at all surprising if, for example, 
latency or speed slowed in conditions of darkness and it would be hard to argue that such changes 
undermined the argument for a functional dissociation between vision for action and vision for 
perception in this experiment. 
Recent criticisms of evidence for the two-visual-systems hypothesis highlight the need for 
new approaches. By devising a design that eschews illusion and demonstrates a functional 
dissociation between perceptual estimates of size and grasp scaling in normal observers Chen et al. 
[2] have moved the debate on the two-visual-systems hypothesis significantly forward. 
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Figure 1. Grasping an illusion: the Titchener circles’ task of Aglioti et al. [9]. 
The observer, who grip size is being measured, grasps one of the central discs in this task [9]. The 
surrounding flat circles induce a perceptual illusion that the disc surrounded by large circles is smaller 
than the disc surrounded by small circles. In fact both discs are the same size. As reported by Aglioti 
et al. [9], grip size is relatively unaffected by this illusion in contrast to a perceptual comparison of 
disc sizes, although there is continuing debate as to whether the effect of the illusion on action and on 
perception truly differs [10].  
 In Brief: 
When visual information about an object’s distance is obscured, but its retinal size visible, the object’s 
physical size is ambiguous to vision, however, proprioceptive distance information permits physical 
size to be estimated when grasping the object, but perceptual size estimates remain inaccurate, adding 
to that evidence for distinct visual pathways for perception and action. 
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